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Peirce’s philosophy can be interpreted as an integration of mysticism and science. In Peirce’s 
philosophy mind is feeling on the inside and on the outside, spontaneity, chance and chaos 
with a tendency to take habits. Peirce’s philosophy has an emptiness beyond the three worlds 
of reality (his Categories), which is the source from where the categories spring. He empha-
sizes that God cannot be conscious in the way humans are, because there is no content in 
his “mind.” Since there is a transcendental3 nothingness behind and before the categories, 
it seems that Peirce had a mystical view on reality with a transcendental Godhead. Thus 
Peirce seems to be a panentheist.4  It seems fair to characterize him as a mystic whose path 
to enlightenment is science as a social activity.
Introduction 
The relation between science and Christianity in the West has been somewhat hostile ever since the trials against Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) 
and Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) in the Renaissance. But 
so have relations between the Church and the mystics ever 
since Meister Eckhart (1260–1328) was excommunicated 
from the church after his death in the Middle Ages. In 
modernity, science and religion have divided the arena 
of metaphysics between them. They are, however, still 
competing about how to explain the origin of humans 
and the universe, especially in the situations where 
fundamentalist versions of one or both of them are being 
promoted. But in general they seem to have established 
a peaceful division of territory in which mechanistic 
science’s Big Bang theory covers nature, including the 
human body, and religion covers the area of “the inner 
world” or “the soul.” As the scientific worldview has 
not been able to render the idea of a metaphysics of the 
sacred and of personal and cultural values superfluous, 
institutionalized religion is still one of the major forms 
of organizing the existential-phenomenological aspect 
of human life. But there are neither empirically nor 
philosophically good reasons to believe that either classical 
mechanical and positivistic science, or the present forms 
of organized religion, or attempts to combine their 
knowledge, have made us—or will make us—able to 
understand and control the fundamental processes of 
mind and nature. The promise of artificial intelligence, 
which would represent such mastery, remains unfulfilled 
(Ekbia 2008). Where questions of the origin of mind, 
life, matter, and nature meet, there seems to be a black 
hole in our conceptual knowledge. This chasm points to 
a fundamental lack in the foundation of our knowledge 
and/or our understanding of knowledge. It is here that one 
can see Peirce’s (1866-1913/1994) semiotic philosophy of 
religious and scientific knowing as an attempt to create 
a new transdisciplinary start on what I claim to be a 
panentheistic basis.5 
 Classical positivism, and later classical empiricism 
and rationalism, developed into the logical positivism 
and finally logical empiricism with its physicalistic 
vision of the unity of science; these are the first real 
reflective philosophies of that conception of the 
empirical-mathematical sciences that emerged during the 
Renaissance. Logical empiricism flowered, especially in the 
1930’s, and after World War II almost rose to be science’s 
only well-established self-understanding. But after World 
War II, the majority of the theoretical developments 
within the philosophy of science became critical of this 
paradigm. An attempt was made to develop a more 
comprehensive understanding of the cognitive processes 
of science, as well as an epistemological understanding 
of its type of knowledge vis-à-vis other types of knowing 
such as an everyday understanding of the world.
Karl R. Popper (1972) and Thomas Kuhn (1970) 
are two of the most prominent philosophers of science 
in this development. Popper’s and Kuhn’s theories of 
science discuss whether observations and experiments can 
expand our knowledge of nature in such a way that we 
get a more and more truthful description. Is the growth 
of science an approach to a final description of the law(s) 
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of nature, or are we just establishing still more—often 
incompatible—viewpoints to describe an impenetrable 
complexity? Are we just receiving more information 
without getting nearer the truth? Popper (1972) has been 
endorsed as believer in the view that science get closer 
to the truth, and Kuhn (1970) as a social constructivist 
denying any kind of objective measure of truth and 
scientific progress. But Popper and Kuhn’s viewpoints 
are not as incompatible as they might appear. According 
to my analysis (Brier, 2006), Kuhn and Popper meet in 
the middle, the former attaching more importance to the 
social psychological mechanisms in science and the latter 
more to the logic of research. The important point is that 
both abandon the simple view of science’s truth-value that 
is often based on a mechanical monistic or dualistic view 
of the world.  Pierce, like both Kuhn and Popper, points 
to the fallibility and incompleteness of science and to the 
important influence of metaphysical ideas and values 
upon the development of scientific knowledge. Both 
Popper and Kuhn agree that we cannot measure how near 
a theory is to truth or if science should even be portrayed 
as getting nearer to some kind of big truth, but we can 
see that knowledge grows and evolves and becomes more 
comprehensive. Thus it seems that science alone is not an 
applicable tool to reveal the big truth about the nature, 
meaning, and purpose of life and/or the nature of the 
universe. Peirce wrote:
Thus, the universe is not a mere mechanical result 
of the operation of blind law. The most obvious of 
all its characters cannot be so explained. It is the 
multitudinous facts of all experience that show us 
this; but that which has opened our eyes to these 
facts is the principle of fallibilism. Those who fail to 
appreciate the importance of fallibilism reason: we 
see these laws of mechanics; we see how extremely 
closely they have been verified in some cases. We 
suppose that what we haven’t examined is like what 
we have examined, and that these laws are absolute, 
and the whole universe is a boundless machine 
working by the blind laws of mechanics. This is a 
philosophy which leaves no room for a God! No, 
indeed! It leaves even human consciousness, which 
cannot well be denied to exist, as a perfectly idle and 
functionless flâneur in the world, with no possible 
influence upon anything -- not even upon itself. 
(Peirce, 1866-1913/1994, Vol. 1, p. 162.)
 Since the start of classical physics in the 16th 
century, our mathematical and logical description of the 
physical, chemical, and biological universe has gradually 
grown to dominate our worldview. Our understanding 
has been invaded by this universe to an extent where it has 
become common sense to see our lived worlds as a part 
of the universe, each individual’s life a small subjective 
world full of signification and “sense-making” within 
an objective universe. Through communication and co-
operation these small signification spheres (Brier, 1999) 
are connected in social and cultural practice domains 
to that world of signification we call a culture. But still 
this world is—from natural science-based disciplines 
such as Western medicine—paradoxically seen as part 
of an objective and meaningless universe (well-described 
by Monod, 1972). The paradox lies in realizing that the 
ability to obtain knowledge comes before science, that 
symbolic knowing needs a self-conscious, embodied 
language user, that language needs signs to represent 
the nature and origins of reality and a society to convey 
meaning. This allows one to see the limitation of purely 
scientific explanations of the phenomenon of knowledge 
(Brier, 2008a, b, c).
 The process of knowing is the prerequisite for 
science. How then can knowledge and intelligence ever 
be thought to be fully explained by a science based on 
physicalistic or functionalistic worldviews? As there is 
no knowledge without mind, no mind without nature, 
and no meaning without meaningfully embodied signs 
communicated in a society, how are we to explain 
knowing (the process) from a materialistic, bottom-up 
model based on a mechanistic understanding of the 
Big Bang theory, where life, intelligence, language, 
and knowledge are supposed to be explained through 
mathematical laws and logic? My suggestion is, therefore, 
that we have to live with both the universe and the world 
in a new and fruitful way, first by acknowledging that 
there are different worlds of description (Brier, 2008a, b, 
c). 
 Human scientific knowledge seems to be con-
nected to an undetermined amount of non-knowledge, 
and it seems that the more exact and universal we want 
to make our knowledge, the more non-knowledge goes 
with it. It does leave open the possibility that reality 
provides an inner connection between different worlds, 
and that the universe is beyond a thorough scientific 
description but roughly describable anyway. Such a 
framework might help us to gain a less fundamentalist 
view of science and religion, and give us a better chance to 
judge the inner logic and consistency of different kinds of 
spiritual healing practices. Based on C. S. Peirce’s (1866-
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1913/1994) semiotic philosophy, I will attempt to outline 
a modern metaphysics of origin and cognition with the 
purpose of adding the existential-phenomenological 
dimension to the modern scientific evolutionary Big 
Bang model of the creation of the Universe by relating 
feeling, meaning, willing and conscious knowing to 
our scientific concept of reality without experienced 
meaning. Thus I will interpret Peirce in the light of the 
modern development of science and philosophy. 
The Myth of Creation 
and the Theory of Evolution
In the Christian world, the biblical stories of creation are the principle myths of origin. Here the world is 
understood as being created by a personal God through a 
period of seven days. All order in nature (laws of nature) 
and in the human world (morals, laws) are given once 
and for all. There is nothing new under the sun. There 
is more in the cause than in the means. Man has, as 
something quite exceptional, received a soul. Nature as 
such is without soul. These myths in their fundamentalist 
and dogmatic understanding do not allow any symbolic 
interpretation and are in conflict with modernity’s 
material, evolutionary self-understanding.
 An important feature of modernity is its 
conception of itself as a participant in a unique cultural 
process of progress. The universal, historical, linear 
understanding of time, which appeared in the 18th 
century in connection with the Enlightenment, is an 
important contribution to mankind’s view of the world 
and itself. In the 19th century it spread from geology 
(e.g., Charles Lyell [1842], Principles of Geology) to 
an evolutionary understanding of the origin of the 
species advocated by Charles Darwin (1859/1998) and 
others. Through thermodynamics—as in Prigogine’s 
(1980; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984) understanding—
this materialistic conception of evolution can now be 
coupled to the 20th century’s cosmological understand-
ing of the universe as something that came into being 
once, approximately 15 billion years ago, with a Big 
Bang, when “nothing became everything.”
 In the modern developments of historical 
materialistic theory of society and culture, the world 
and humankind are seen as historical developments 
carrying this grand evolution. We understand thereby 
our world(s) as something, which has developed from the 
universe through time from simple physical beginnings 
(Popper, 1972). Furthermore we understand ourselves 
fundamentally as material end-products of an historical 
development. This has very often been considered as the 
absolute opposite to the more phenomenological idea of 
creation.
 The question now is whether the difference between 
evolution and creation is of an absolute character. What 
is the relation between the physical and the phenomeno-
logical reality, if any? Is there no connection between 
the universe and our worlds? Should it not be possible 
to make a modern metaphysics of creation, which does 
not contradict physics and, at the same time, aims 
at explaining the organizing power of evolution and 
thereby the origin of mind and consciousness? For it 
is a peculiarity that modern evolutionary materialism 
actually ascribes all creative abilities in the universe 
either to absolute deterministic law or to absolute chance 
(often understood as the negation of deterministic law) 
and postulates that life, mind and consciousness appear 
out of the organization of dead matter as new emergent 
qualities in self-organized systems. It is here the concept 
of information in nature is introduced as an objective 
organizing power, a natural force (Brier, 1992). But 
unfortunately, as soon as information is scientifically 
defined as objective, mathematical and mechanical, it 
can no longer be used as a tool to explain the emergence 
of life and mind in evolution (Brier, 1999).
 The Cartesian metaphysics of modern science 
forces it to look for some kind of meeting point of the 
inner and outer worlds in the dynamics of the human 
brain. For medicine, this is where the psychosomatic link 
must be. That we have not found this link is supposed 
to be caused by our lack of physiological knowledge of 
the nervous system, especially the brain. That is one of 
the reasons neurosciences and cognitive sciences have 
experienced such a big boom over the last decade: we 
want to find that connection (Penrose, 1995; Searle, 
1986). To Peirce (1866-1913/1994),6 it was his triadic, 
evolutionary, pragmaticistic semiotics that provided the 
connection between inner and outer, or rather the basis 
for going beyond this dichotomy.
 We have come to understand that the nervous 
system, the hormone system, and the immune system 
are chemically linked to each other like a “biological 
self” in the way that they all produce receptors for each 
others’ messenger molecules. This supports the idea of a 
second-order cybernetics, one which sees living systems 
as self-organized and self-producing beings: autopoietic 
as Maturana and Varela (1986) called it. From a bio-
cybernetic point of view, one can point out that living 
systems organize worlds, which I, from a semiotic point 
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of view, call “signification spheres” (Brier, 2008a). But 
this theory is still based on the pre-assumption of an 
“inner world or life” of the living systems in the form 
of an observer (Brier, 1999) and it does not provide the 
explanatory connection. It is too cybernetic to develop 
a theory of first person experience, emotion, will, and 
qualia (Brier, 2008b). 
 Is it possible to arrive at an understanding of man 
and the universe that embraces modern science without 
seeing phenomenological man as a gypsy on the edge of a 
dead, foreign, and meaningless wasteland—what Monod 
(1972) so eloquently described as the consequence of 
mechanism also encompassing the biological description 
of life? Is it possible in the natural-science-technical age to 
bring man and the living into the center of a philosophical 
existential vision again? This is in my opinion what 
Peirce (1992) does in his scientific mysticism. To name 
his view as scientific mysticism will seem to many to be 
a paradox. Mysticism is a mode of thought, or phase of 
intellectual or religious life, in which reliance is placed 
upon a spiritual illumination believed to transcend 
the ordinary powers of understanding. As such is it is 
often viewed as opposing a rational understanding of 
the world, and therefore the whole scientific enterprise. 
 But Peirce shows that it is actually mysticism and 
rationalism that represent opposite poles of theology. 
Rationalism regards reason—often in the form of logic 
or mathematics—as the highest faculty of man. In a 
modern (positivistic) interpretation of Plato, then, it 
is the rational thought of the philosopher or scientist, 
or both working together, that is the sole arbiter in all 
matters of knowledge and as such overthrows all religious 
doctrines. This view often sees the world as a computer 
and believes that all knowledge can be algorithmically 
represented. Mysticism, on the other hand, is often 
understood to declare that spiritual truth cannot be 
apprehended by the logical faculty, nor adequately 
expressed in any form of natural language. Peirce manages 
to combine both views in a pragmaticistic semiotic 
evolutionary philosophy, where logic is semiotics. 
 If it is correct, as Prigogine and Stengers (1984) 
claimed, that thermodynamics and quantum physics, 
seen together philosophically, are a more realistic and 
comprehensive worldview than classic mechanism, then 
spontaneity, irreversibility, time, and evolution have 
made their entrance as basal conceptions in physics 
(Prigogine, 1980). Then the belief in the complete 
scientific description of nature also ceases. We must 
realize that it is probably not possible for natural science 
to uncover Nature’s or matter’s “inner being,” if there 
is one. In natural science we are obliged, on the basis 
of observation, experiment, and generalization to make 
statistical models or “laws” based upon the calculus of 
probability and our critical judgment. 
 The new recognition of complex non-linear 
systems accentuates that, even if one knew the laws that 
govern a system’s basic dynamics, this is not enough 
to understand its detailed development, as the initial 
conditions are very crucial. Physics also realizes that 
no version of the Big Bang theory will tell us how the 
Universe was created, because the original “singularity” 
eludes scientific examination. Physical explanations do 
not start until after the universe is initiated. Further, 
mechanical physics does not have an interest in 
explaining the rise of mind and consciousness through 
evolution, as it was founded in a dualistic worldview 
where nature was mechanical by necessity. This was a 
foundational aspect in Kant’s (1781/1990) philosophy, 
an approach that Peirce (1866-1913/1994) further 
modified. 
 As Kultgen (1959-60) argued, it is important that 
both Peirce (1866-1913/1994) and Whitehead (1929) 
deny Kant’s (1981/1990) distinction between nature 
and freedom. To Peirce, nature has spontaneity and 
pure feeling at its basis in Firstness and teleology in its 
agapistic habit-taking of Thirdness. Thus Peirce denies 
the distinction between the phenomenological and the 
noumenal—understood as the thing in itself—because 
this idea of the incognizable appears as a null-term of 
theoretical and practical thought. It is not fruitful to try 
to think about something that one cannot think about. 
For Peirce, the real is wholly open to our pragmatic 
observation and thinking and there is no absolute 
difference between the object of theoretical and practical 
thought. Metaphysics is seen as an observable ideal 
limit of empirical inquiry (Kultgen, 1959-60, p. 288). 
Peirce did not have the modern and post-modern fear 
of metaphysics, and certainly did not see it as opposed 
to the scientific inquiry; therefore, he did not have the 
type of conflict between science and religion that is seen 
in the modern debate about intelligent design theory 
(see Fuller, 1998, 2002a, 2002b). 
Peirce’s Philosophy 
of Creation and Evolution
It is important to notice that we do not here discuss religion as a social enterprise or the dogmas of 
established religions. Peirce (1976) is against dogmas in 
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religion and he does not cling to any single religion. In a 
letter to William James he wrote: 
I can’t help thinking that the mother of Christianity, 
Buddhism, is superior to our own religion. That is 
what one of my selves, my intellectual self says. But 
enough, I will keep my religion to myself and to One 
that does not scoff at it. (Vol. 3[2], p. 872)     
 In the quote above Peirce seems keen to work 
with that which is the foundation of all religions. His 
theory of the immanent7 divine as Firstness8 is close to 
the Buddhist idea of the void.  Secondness is, in Peirce’s 
philosophy, necessary in order for anything to take form in 
this world, while Thirdness is needed to stabilize any kind 
of structure and process. This is a principal philosophical 
discussion of how and where a concept of God may enter 
or have to enter a philosophy that can produce a concept 
of meaning and signification. It is important to note 
that Peirce is inspired in his theological philosophy not 
only by transcendental Christianity and by Buddhism 
with its concept of emptiness, but also by Aristotle and 
Plato.9 The divine is both immanent and transcendent in 
Peirce’s philosophy. It is both an emptiness “behind and 
before” the manifested world in time and space as well as 
a Firstness of possibilities, “random sporting,” qualia, and 
possible mathematical forms. Peirce (1866-1913/1994) 
wrote:
If we are to proceed in a logical and scientific manner, 
we must, in order to account for the whole universe, 
suppose an initial condition in which the whole 
universe was non-existent, and therefore a state of 
absolute nothing. . . .
 But this is not the nothing of negation. . . . The 
nothing of negation is the nothing of death, which 
comes second to, or after, everything. But this pure 
zero is the nothing of not having been born. There 
is no individual thing, no compulsion, outward nor 
inward, no law. It is the germinal nothing, in which the 
whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such, 
it is absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility—
boundless possibility. There is no compulsion and no 
law. It is boundless freedom.
 Now the question arises, what necessarily 
resulted from that state of things? But the only sane 
answer is that where freedom was boundless nothing 
in particular necessarily resulted. . . .
 I say that nothing necessarily resulted from the 
Nothing of boundless freedom. That is, nothing 
according to deductive logic. But such is not the 
logic of freedom or possibility. The logic of freedom, 
or potentiality, is that it shall annul itself. For if it 
does not annul itself, it remains a completely idle 
and do-nothing potentiality; and a completely idle 
potentiality is annulled by its complete idleness. 
(Vol. 6, pp. 215-219)
On this basis of the divine, the concept of law in Peirce’s 
philosophy is not the same as in Platonic inspired 
deterministic mechanism, where laws are universal, 
precise, mathematical, and therefore deterministic 
in themselves, upholding their own existence in the 
transcendent. Peirce wrote:
I do not mean that potentiality immediately 
results in actuality. Mediately perhaps it does; but 
what immediately resulted was that unbounded 
potentiality became potentiality of this or that sort 
–that is, of some quality.
  Thus the zero of bare possibility, by evolutionary 
logic, leapt into the unit of some quality. (Vol. 6, p. 
220)
For Peirce, Firstness is a vague, dynamic, random mix 
of possible forms of existence in “pure feeling.” The 
potentiality of a quality, in Peirce’s metaphysics, is a 
timeless, self-subsisting possibility that serves as the 
metaphysical ground of the world of actual existence. He 
wrote:
The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere 
evolution of the existing universe, but rather a process 
by which the very Platonic forms themselves have 
become or are becoming developed. (Vol. 6, p. 194)
These forms start as vague qualities and become developed 
in the irreversible evolution of the world—a concept 
foreign to Plato—to become more stable and precise in 
form. Peirce further wrote:
The evolution of forms begins or, at any rate, has for an 
early stage of it, a vague potentiality; and that either 
is or is followed by a continuum of forms having a 
multitude of dimensions too great for the individual 
dimensions to be distinct. It must be by a contraction 
of the vagueness of that potentiality of everything in 
general, but of nothing in particular, that the world 
of forms comes about. (Vol. 6, p. 196)
Thus in Peirce’s cosmology the qualities are vague; Peirce 
saw trancendentality and vagueness as going together in 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 25Peircean Panentheist Scientific Mysticism
reality. It is not as in classical logic, where the very precise 
is also the very abstract and universal, which is also the 
way in which Plato’s ideas are usually interpreted. Peirce 
wrote:
We must not assume that the qualities arose separate 
and came into relation afterward. It was just the 
reverse. The general indefinite potentiality became 
limited and heterogeneous. (Vol. 6, p. 199)
This is when the basic categories manifest or sort themselves 
out. As the categories are phaneroscopic, Peirce also refers 
to them as “universes of experience.” With the emergence 
of the continuum of positive possibility, the Universe of 
Ideas or Possibility, Firstness is established (Vol. 6, p. 
455). The next step is then the emergence of Secondness, 
as Peirce’s categories are also evolutionary:
There is, however, an element of Secondness in the 
emergence of the continuum of forms where there was 
only indefinite nothingness before, and an element of 
Thirdness in the continuity and eternal subsistence of 
those forms. As the evolution continues, Secondness 
comes to the fore. Nascent relations of identity 
and difference emerge in and among parts of the 
continuum of forms, and qualities thereby come to 
be differentiated. 
 The second element we have to assume is that 
there could be accidental reactions between those 
qualities. The qualities themselves are mere eternal 
possibilities. But these reactions we must think of as 
events. Not that Time was. But still, they had all the 
here-and-nowness of events. (Vol. 6, p. 200)
Peirce also stated that Secondness is the category of 
“brute facts,” resistance, will, force, and concreteness. He 
therefore wrote: “The next milestone in the evolution of 
the cosmos is the appearance of enduring existence, the 
Universe of Brute Actuality of things and facts” (Vol. 6, 
p. 455). 
 How is this possible? Peirce (1866-1913/1994) 
has the following suggestion that is very similar to the 
way modern physics talks about the universe emerging 
from a quantum vacuum field, except that Peirce’s field 
has another nature because it is in another metaphysical 
framework. Like Aristotle, he is a hylozoist10 and a 
continuation thinker. Hylé11—the sensitive matter—is a 
kind of field. He wrote:
Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that 
there would have come something, by the principle 
of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the 
principle of habit there would have been a second 
flash. Though time would not yet have been, this 
second flash was in some sense after the first, because 
resulting from it. Then there would have come other 
successions ever more and more closely connected, 
the habits and the tendency to take them ever 
strengthening themselves, until the events would 
have been bound together into something like a 
continuous flow. (Vol. 1, p. 412)
Here Peirce is close to the quantum field view of the origin 
of the universe, where original quantum events, such as 
the constant spontaneous play of virtual particles within 
the Planck time and space limit, is suddenly pushed over 
the limit and starts a new form of regular existence. This 
is what Peirce described as nature taking habits and drastic 
events in that habit-taking are often in physics called ‘phase 
shifts.’ Peirce next turns to the principle of habit-taking, 
which is so essential for stability and evolution at the same 
time: 
all things have a tendency to take habits. . . . [For] every 
conceivable real object, there is a greater probability of 
acting as on a former like occasion than otherwise. 
This tendency itself constitutes a regularity, and is 
continually on the increase. . . . It is a generalizing 
tendency; it causes actions in the future to follow some 
generalizations of past actions; and this tendency itself 
is something capable of similar generalizations; and 
thus, it is self-generative. (Vol. 1, p. 409)
 Peirce is again close to how modern quantum metaphysics 
conceptualizes a many-world ontology, where mutual 
universes are possible, existing side by side unaware of each 
other. He wrote. 
The quasi-flow which would result would, however, 
differ essentially from time in this respect that it 
would not necessarily be in a single stream. Different 
flashes might start different streams, between which 
there should be no relations of contemporaneity or 
succession. So one stream might branch into two, or 
two might coalesce. But the further result of habit 
would inevitably be to separate utterly those that were 
long separated, and to make those which presented 
frequent common points coalesce into perfect union. 
Those that were completely separated would be so 
many different worlds which would know nothing of 
one another; so that the effect would be just what we 
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actually observe. (Vol. 1, p. 412)
Peirce then described how the forms of the world appear 
through stabilization of the early habit-formation tendencies 
in ways similar to how modern science also describes the 
early universe before matter and radiation separate. Pairs 
of states will also begin to take habits, and thus each state 
having different habits with reference to the different 
other states will give rise to bundles of habits, which will 
be substances. Some of these states will chance to take 
habits of persistency, and will get to be less and less liable to 
disappear; while those that fail to take such habits will fall 
out of existence. Thus substances will get to be permanent.
 Peirce does not assume eternal transcendental 
“ideas,” like Plato, or their existence only in consciousness, 
like Husserl. As a true evolutionary, he started with vague 
beginnings, which within the Firstness of all possibilities 
crystallize out in a kind of phase shift—I suggest—into 
some basic differences that make up the foundation of 
the evolution of what Peirce call Secondness.  In this 
way the cosmos develops into a state where Secondness 
predominates, which Peirce calls the Universe of Actuality 
(Parker, 2002).
 In this way Peirce dares to give an ontological 
explanation based on a metaphysics of how the first 
differences come about and then avoids the philosophical 
embarrassment of an “open ontology” as in Luhmann’s 
(1995) ontological foundation of his epistemology. Still Peirce 
avoids a deterministic universe because in such a domain 
nothing forces there to be a tendency in evolution toward 
regularity in what Peirce calls the Universe of Actuality. He 
does not use the concept of forces here, because the notion 
of force implies necessity, and here we are rather talking 
about a selection process out of a spontaneous variety. 
This of course brings in the concept of irreversible time, 
where Pierce is close to Prigogine and Stengers’s (1984) 
interpretation of thermodynamics and the “arrow of time.” 
Habit-taking “can grow by its own virtue” (Peirce, 1866-
1913/1994, Vol. 6, p. 101) and is a self-amplifying process, 
which leads to the ordered regularity and reasonability of 
Peirce’s Thirdness.
 The laws in the universe represent deviations from the 
random and are therefore of significance. As argued earlier, 
it is difficult to talk about knowledge without assuming any 
kind of regularity in both the inside and outside reality, as 
also Heinz von Foerster realized (Brier, 2005). Peirce (1866-
1913/1994) wrote:
Uniformities are precisely the kind of facts that 
need to be accounted for. That a pitched coin should 
sometimes turn up heads and sometimes tails calls 
for no particular explanation; but if it shows heads 
every time, we wish to know how this result has 
been brought about. Law is par excellence the thing 
which wants a reason. (Vol. 6, p. 12).
But as regularity comes to operate with increasing force 
in the universe, law takes hold. In the infinite future, 
Peirce saw a universe developing in which law would 
become (almost) perfect. But he also saw that the only 
possible way of accounting for the existence of laws of 
nature and uniformity in general was to suppose them 
results of evolution. Then his concept of law becomes 
qualitatively different from the mechanistic one. 
He does not suppose the laws to be absolute or to be 
obeyed precisely. There will always remain an element 
of indeterminacy, spontaneity, or absolute chance in 
nature. This view also pertains to his concept of time. 
In the following quote he sums it up his view on law, 
physicality, mind, and time.  He wrote:
I believe the law of habit to be purely psychical. 
But then I suppose matter is merely mind deadened 
by the development of habit. While every physical 
process can be reversed without violation of the 
law of mechanics, the law of habit forbids such 
reversal. Accordingly, time may have been evolved 
by the action of habit. At first sight, it seems absurd 
or mysterious to speak of time being evolved, for 
evolution presupposes time. But after all, this is 
no serious objection, and nothing can be simpler. 
Time consists in a regularity in the relations of 
interacting feelings. The first chaos consisted in an 
infinite multitude of unrelated feelings. As there 
was no continuity about them, it was, as it were, 
a powder of feelings. It was worse than that, for of 
particles of powder some are nearer together, others 
farther apart, while these feelings had no relations, 
for relations are general. Now you must not ask 
me what happened first. This would be as absurd 
as to ask what is the smallest finite number. But 
springing away from the infinitely distant past to 
a very very distant past, we find already evolution 
had been going on for an infinitely long time. But 
this “time” is only our way of saying that something 
had been going on. There was no real time so far as 
there was no regularity, but there is no more falsity 
in using the language of time than in saying that 
a quantity is zero. In this chaos of feelings, bits of 
similitude had appeared, been swallowed up again. 
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Had reappeared by chance. A slight tendency to 
generalization had here and there lighted up and 
been quenched. Had reappeared, had strengthened 
itself. Like had begun to produce like. Then even 
pairs of unlike feelings had begun to have similars, 
and then these had begun to generalize. And thus 
relations of contiguity, that is connections other than 
similarities, had sprung up. All this went on in ways 
I cannot now detail till the feelings were so bound 
together that a passable approximation to a real time 
was established. It is not to be supposed that the 
ideally perfect time has even yet been realized. There 
are no doubt occasional lacunae and derailments. 
(Peirce, 1866-1913/1994, Vol. 8, p. 318)
 Thus we have a profound evolutionary and process 
view, with only three basic categories, which determines 
the types of possible interactions, the triadicity of semiosis 
being the third mediating type that is the primary drive 
of evolution. This is also the Universe in which the 
(almost) completely reasonable state of things—that 
Peirce in his esthetics saw as an ideal—would  be made 
possible. The (almost) caveat is there because this universe 
is unrealizable in principle, as it would destroy any sort 
of  the spontaneity and feeling that emanates from 
Firstness balancing necessity. But it is the regulative ideal 
toward which self-controlled thought and action move, 
and which is Peirce’s personal, social, and philosophical 
aim: the summum bonum in Peirce’s philosophy12 (see 
Parker, 2002) that is the inspiration of many of the 
above formulations. Thus Peirce’s (1866-1913/1994) 
pragmaticist concept of truth is different from analytical 
philosophy combined with that dualistic combination 
of mechanism and Platonism that Descartes founded. 
Peirce wrote:  
truth is the concordance of an abstract statement 
with the ideal limit towards which endless 
investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, 
which concordance the abstract statement may 
possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy 
and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential 
ingredient of truth. (Vol. 5, p. 565)
The scientific finding of truth is thus in principle a 
possibility and is therefore still a guiding light for all 
scientific and scholarly enterprise. The world is made of a 
kind of abstract knowledge—the dynamic structures and 
processes, which in themselves are a kind of signs—and 
therefore it is knowable. It is the indifference of the sign 
to mind-independence or mind-dependence that makes 
it possible for us to relate the real and the ideal without 
detriment to either. 
 In Brier (2007, 2008a) I argued that the first 
distinction or sign making process must be breaking 
some kind of original wholeness. Theoretically some 
kind of original observer13 has to be accepted in order to 
understand the first semiotic creation of an interpretant. 
Thus this theory for philosophical consistency demands 
a kind of objective idealism where mind is first, matter 
is second, and the tendency to take habits is third, as 
Peirce theorized. There has to be some kind of awareness 
resting in itself, that can make the first distinction, 
and therefore the first system-environment difference, 
which is something else than the wholeness.14 It breaks 
the wholeness and makes space and time appear. This 
is consistent with Peirce’s view that time emerges with 
evolution. For Peirce, his creational understanding 
means that subject/selves are elements in the potential 
super mind and that they discover themselves as partly 
ignorant beings that make mistakes. They/we come to 
know themselves as individual selves or egos because 
they/we lack knowledge of the whole. They/we realize 
that they are not the whole and are therefore imperfect 
and distinct from the whole. We are individual imperfect 
selves. 
  To Peirce cognition is sign producing and therefore 
the production of signification and meaning. Peirce 
(1868) saw introspection as one of the four incapacities 
of the human being. To him knowledge of the “internal 
world” is wholly a matter of inference by way of sign 
making. The human self can therefore only be inferred 
(Peirce, 1866-1913/1994, Vol. 5, p. 462) and surprisingly, 
it is inferred from our mistakes, from realizing that as 
self-conscious semiotic beings we are not the whole (i.e., 
we are not the Godhead). Human individuation is found 
in ignorance and error. Peirce wrote that “Ignorance 
and error are all that distinguish our private selves from 
the absolute ego of pure apperception” (Peirce, 1866-
1913/1994, Vol. 5, p. 235). Peirce’s argument concerning 
the self was developed in his discussion of the dawning 
of self-consciousness in children:  
It must be about this time that he [the child] begins 
to find that what these people about him say is 
the very best evidence of fact. So much so, that 
testimony is even a stronger mark of fact than the 
facts themselves, or rather than what must now be 
thought of as the appearances themselves. (I may 
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remark, by the way, that this remains so through 
life; testimony will convince a man that he himself 
is mad.) A child hears it said that the stove is hot. 
But it is not, he says; and, indeed, that central body 
is not touching it, and only what that touches is hot 
or cold. But he touches it, and finds the testimony 
confirmed in a striking way. Thus, he becomes aware 
of ignorance, and it is necessary to suppose a self in 
which this ignorance can inhere. So testimony gives 
the first dawning of self-consciousness.... (Vol. 5, p. 
233)
He continued and concluded this way:
[Thus children] infer from ignorance and error their 
own existence. Thus we find that known faculties, 
acting under conditions known to exist, would rise 
to self-consciousness. (Vol. 5, p. 236) 
 We then here see the metaphysical foundation 
that supports Peirce’s view on science and the religion 
or rather the relation between the search for truth and 
the divine in a way that is unique and which I interpret 
as a new type of mysticism. The unity of truth is not in 
the explicit knowledge system as a “grand story.” This 
is what the postmodern movement rightfully objected 
against (Luntley, 1995). Peirce realized this, but kept it 
like a regulative idea (i.e., similar to Kant, 1781/1990), 
as a stage we might reach—not only in theory, but as 
lived reason in harmony with ethics and aesthetics—in 
a very distant future. I therefore agree with Deely (2001) 
in calling Peirce the first true postmodernist. 
Religion and the Sacred
To go beyond fundamentalist religion and its dogmas, I would like to maintain a distinction between 
religion and the sacred. Religion is predominantly a 
social-political institution that organizes the relationship 
between the sacred and the profane with the help of 
rituals and codes. The sacred is defined through the 
fundamental myths, which in the same breath establish 
the worldview and understanding of the human, 
meaning, and society. Through the sacred, the world 
is given meaning, and thereby makes a distinction 
between meaning and the meaningless possible. The 
sacred, therefore, seems to be a power of a completely 
different form than those powers of nature that science 
describes. Typical for many religions is precisely that 
they organize the sacred by combining the emergence of 
the world with the history of the emergence of society 
and its cultural meaningful order based on distinction 
of right and wrong as well as good and bad. In this way, 
it seems obvious that nothing could be different. There is 
therefore no room for a gradual development of religious 
truth, when all the dogmas have been written down. It 
was this understanding of religion that Peirce broke with 
in his new synthesis.
 It is, however, exactly the reflective knowledge 
of the fact that we can change paradigms that we have 
gained from modern philosophy of science, which is 
a decisive trait in the democratic (dialogue-ethical) 
society’s liberation from fundamentalist religions. In 
the liberal democratic society we are human being first 
(i.e., we start in the world of the living, feeling, language 
using, and embodied knowing beings), then we can 
choose to be Christian, Muslim, Marxist, Scientistic, or 
embrace other traditions. This means that one is human 
and has ones own existential relation to the sacred before 
one is religious, ideological, scientific, party political, or 
anything else. I think Peirce would have agreed with this 
view. 
 Fundamentalism can now be formulated as the 
opposite view, namely those who understand themselves 
as belonging to a given system first, and second as a 
member of the human race. It is within such beliefs that 
the goal easily becomes justifiable for any means. When 
you know the fundamental truth, then you also know 
that the others are fundamentally wrong and need to 
be “saved,” or condemned as evil should they resist. The 
pattern is the same within religion, philosophy, politics, 
and science (Brier, 2008a).
 It is important to stand by the fundamental 
status of the estimation/abduction principle for all 
knowledge, both regarding religion and the sciences: 
none of them should be assigned the patent of truth. 
Peirce (1866-1913/1994) wrote on universality:
I object to absolute universality, absolute exactitude, 
absolute necessity, being attributed to any proposition 
that does not deal with the Alpha and the Omega, 
in the which I do not include any object of ordinary 
knowledge. (Vol. 6, p. 607)
This is exactly where Peirce started in his “A Neglected 
Argument for the Reality of God” (p. 452), where he 
further developed the philosophical foundation for his 
concept of abduction. There is in his semiotic philosophy 
neither skepticism about human ability to acquire 
knowledge about the world, nor about the existence 
of a partly independent material reality, living reality, 
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or about the reality of mind as well as of the sacred. 
Combined with his profound evolutionary thinking this 
is a highly original point of view that may finally have 
found its time. But before we analyze Peirce’s viewpoint 
we must briefly discuss the concept of mysticism. In the 
Christian tradition this worldview has often been seen as 
an opposition to the church’s dogmas and in science as 
an opposition to belief in scientific method as the only 
way of obtaining reliable and clear rational knowledge.
Mysticism
The word “mystery” (mysterion) comes from the Greek verb muo, to shut or close the lips or eyes. 
Today the concept mysticism points to a belief in 
the possibility of the mind to make a break through 
the world of time and space into a phenomenological 
beingness of eternal timelessness, all-presence, and 
spacelessness. About this idea of a general mystical 
level, often called the perennial philosophy, Happold 
(1973) wrote:
In the deepest religious experience, whether it be 
Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, or Mohammedan, 
when all ideas, thoughts, sensations, and volitions 
which make up the self are exhausted, there is found 
to remain only a Void, the One of Plotinus, the 
Godhead of Eckhart and Ruysbroeck, the Brahman 
of Hinduism. The Void is not only Emptiness. In 
mystical experience it is found to be a Plenum-Void. 
The Emptiness and the fullness are one. (p. 80)
Mysticism includes the theory of a unity between 
consciousness, body, and universe that is beyond 
language (Happold, 1973; Maharishi, 1979; Stace, 
1960): a unity where distance is gone (i.e., beyond 
space) and presence is total (i.e., beyond time), and 
where words and objects unite (the triadicity of semiosis 
collapses into unity).
 To Peirce (1866-1913/1994), Firstness is an 
element of experience unrelated to other experiences. 
Everything starts as mixed together as a vagueness 
overwhelmingly present in the now that cannot be 
grasped in signs and language. He wrote:
The idea of the absolutely first must be entirely 
separated from all conception of or reference to 
anything else; for what involves a second is itself a 
second to that second. The first must therefore be 
present and immediate, so as not to be second to a 
representation. It must be fresh and new, for if old 
it is second to its former state. It must be initiative, 
original, spontaneous, and free; otherwise it is 
second to a determining cause. It is also something 
vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being the 
object of some sensation. It precedes all synthesis 
and all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. 
It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it 
has already lost its characteristic innocence; for 
assertion always implies a denial of something else. 
(Vol. 1, p. 357)
  All these qualities of absolute Firstness fits 
with the descripton of the mystical union or pure 
consciousness. As Peirce wrote, then it is not an 
experience or a cognition because that would demand a 
full semiosis and therefore the presence of Secondness 
and Thirdness. The Peircean Firstness of monadic 
vagueness becomes the Secondness of a dyadic 
separation through interaction. Consciousness, the 
body, and reality have a sort of common foundation 
in something beyond what we can experience by the 
semiosis of cognition. It is interesting that rational and 
empirical analysis of space and time in physics actually 
leads theories into this paradoxical domain as they 
point beyond the Planck Scale where measuring of time 
and space become impossible. The Planck scale limit of 
meaningful measurement is a part of the foundation 
for quantum theory.
 In his Confessions, St. Augustine (1961) made 
a famous analysis of time where he already made it 
clear that the universe is not created in time but with 
time—and Aristotle draws our attention to the fact 
that the universe, which is the place for everything, 
has no place for itself (i.e., one cannot ask meaning-
fully what there was before the universe’s creation, still 
less, where it was or what is/was outside, as time and 
space only exist as a possibility in a universe). This is 
in accordance with general mysticism, as for instance 
in the writings of Meister Eckhart (1958) and Happold 
(1973, p. 269). Spirit or the sacred is precisely that 
which is transcendent, says the mystic. Therefore it 
is also “everywhere” at the “same time,” and thereby 
also “inside” you and me, as well as “outside” us. The 
quotation marks are put in to show that the usual 
conceptions and distinctions are not enough when 
we speak of spirit. The mystics here will also say that 
“infinity”—and with  it this “space-timelessness”—is 
found “behind” or “in” every point in the universe (pp. 
119-120). The spirit is also immanent in the world as 
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love and creative power in matter. The mystics see it 
shine through the material appearances. Every self-
conscious person therefore has in principle direct 
access to the spirit, since consciousness is also one of its 
manifestations. When consciousness is without content 
it is pure consciousness: that is to say, consciousness 
that is only conscious of itself (Maharishi,15 1968, 
1979). The human nervous system’s most fundamental 
achievement is precisely this capacity to reflect reality’s 
non-manifest aspect, which is the connection between 
the inner and the outer world. Peirce (1866-1913/1994) 
is a bit skeptical about this capacity. He wrote:
The immediate present, could we seize it, would 
have no character but its Firstness. Not that I mean 
to say that immediate consciousness (a pure fiction, 
by the way), would be Firstness, but that the quality 
of what we are immediately conscious of, which is 
no fiction, is Firstness. (Vol. 1, p. 343)
 This mystical understanding of the ability 
of human consciousness to be in a sort of absolute 
Firstness as foundational to human consciousness is 
central to mysticism and so persistent over different 
cultures, historical periods, inside and outside different 
religions that the philosopher Leibniz (1992) called 
this view “the perennial philosophy,” a name Aldous 
Huxley (1945/1979) renewed in 1945 with a book on 
the subject. The perennial philosophy is the idea that 
a common, eternal philosophy exists that underlies all 
religious movements, in particular the mystical streams 
within them. The induction on many observations 
is that humans in many different cultures and all 
historical eras have recorded similar perceptions and 
experiences about the nature of reality, the self, and the 
world, including the meaning and purpose of existence 
and human life. Scholars supporting this view argue 
that these similarities point to underlying universal 
principles. They further conclude that these are the 
principles that form the common ground of most 
religions. Opposing those who claim that experiences—
among them the religious ones—are totally determined 
by the culture’s metaphysical views in the given period 
of history, the perennial philosophy claims that the 
differences in the way these fundamental perceptions 
are described arise from differences in human cultures. 
Thus in opposition to those scholars that claim that 
there is no unity behind the differences, the perennial 
philosophy claims that there is a fundamental unity 
and the differences can be explained in light of cultural 
conditioning. In a philosophical analysis, Stace (1960) 
and Happold (1973) concluded that this is a well 
founded theory and, in his history of philosophy, the 
Norwegian ecological philosopher Arne Næss (1969, p. 
69) pointed to convincing similarities between Master 
Eckhart and Shankara’s paradigms of consciousness, 
even though one of them is a German Christian and 
the other an Indian Hindu—and several centuries 
divide them. Happold (1973) wrote:
the essence of that perennial mystical philosophy 
which is found in all the higher theistic religions:
That the Godhead is absolute Stillness and Rest, free 
of all activity and inaccessible to human thought, 
yet alive through and through, a tremendous 
Energy, pouring Itself out into the created world 
and drawing that world back into Itself.
That there is a complete unity in everything, all is 
in God and God is in all.
That man’s real self is divine.
...the Godhead is not only Eternal rest, 
Unconditioned Dark, the Nameless Being, but 
also the Superessence of all Created things. Man 
is, thus, not a creature set over against God; he 
is united with this triune life, and, this union is 
within us by our naked nature and were this nature 
to be separated from God it would fall into pure 
nothingness. (p. 66)
 Conscious development is thus to regain 
consciousness (the full awareness of) reality’s immanent 
as well as transcendent aspects without violating the 
diversity in the relative manifestation. Expressed in 
concepts from Heidegger’s (1949/1962) philosophy, 
it is to be aware of the connection between “dasein” 
and the universe in which we are “thrown.” It is to be 
conscious of the roots of our “thrownness.” Only from 
this position can we get rid of the “blindness” in our 
perception of reality.16 I think Heidegger’s concept of 
“blindness” is pointing out what in the Vedic tradition 
is called “Maya.” It is that, which the unenlightened 
considers ultimate reality, but is still only a veil, a 
construction projected by our own inability to see 
things as they are in full.17 In science, it is the “physical 
reality” that is the last veil. Grand narratives are also 
veils. The relative (Maya) is not unreal in the sense 
that it does not exist, but  rather in the sense that 
there is a more stable background “behind” it of pure 
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consciousness, in which the root of all knowledge is to 
be found. Happold (1973) wrote that this is found:
when religious feeling surpasses its rational content, 
that is, when the hidden, non-rational, unconscious 
elements predominate and determine the emotional 
life and the intellectual attitude. In the true mystic 
there is an extension of normal consciousness, a 
release of latent powers and a widening of vision, 
so that aspects of truth unplumbed by the rational 
intellect are revealed to him. (p. 19)
 Knowledge (gnosis) has here a deep 
phenomenological foundation that transgresses –but does 
not reject—our normal understanding of the scientific 
and the rational. Mystical knowledge is subjective, 
without being personally individualistic, in that it bases 
itself on subjectivity’s general aspect. To reach this is to 
attain what our culture once called wisdom. This type 
of knowledge may well be the central or fundamental 
aspect of human knowledge. It is embodiment of the 
deepest knowledge of ourselves and nature connecting 
inner and outer being. It is from his musing that Peirce 
created his concept of science as a social and ethical 
commitment to create a logically consistent foundation 
of knowledge for the development of human culture. He 
saw science as another form of religious commitment in 
the never-ending search for truth. I think the second part 
of the following quote by Happold (1973) describes very 
well Peirce’s understanding and the basis of his method 
of musing:
One view of the world is that it is an intelligible 
presentation which is spread out before us for our 
detached and dispassionate examination; its nature 
can be grasped by thought, analysis and classification 
alone. This view has been held by most philosophers 
and scientists. Another view is that the world is not 
like that at all, that it is a “mystery,” the secret of which 
can only be partially grasped by thought, analysis, 
and classification. To penetrate its deepest secrets 
one must not stand aside from it but try, as it were, 
to feel it. One must be content, intently and humbly, 
to “contemplate” it, to gage at it as one might gage at 
a picture, not in order to analyse the technique of its 
brushwork or colour arrangement, but to penetrate 
its meaning and significance. This intent, loving 
gazing in order to know and understand is what is 
meant when we say that contemplation is a tool of 
knowledge. (p. 70)
One can say that Peirce combined both visions by 
considering none of them to be absolutely true alone, 
but both may well be true together. A lot of the universe 
is within the reach of human understanding through 
science, but it seems that only a very little part is laid out 
in the open as simple computational laws. Still Peirce 
believed that in principle we should be able to get to know 
everything if we worked on it in a dedicated scientific 
way. But in reality he was aware that there was probably 
not time and money enough to ever reach that stage in 
semiotically based knowledge.
Peircean Scientific Mysticism18
In the article “A Neglected Argument for the Existence of God,” Peirce (1866-1913/1994, Vol. 6, p. 452) 
contended that the very first step in abductive reasoning 
is a form of Pure Play, which he calls Musement. He 
describes it this way:
Pure Play has no rules, except this very law of liberty. 
It bloweth where it listeth. It has no purpose, unless 
recreation. The particular occupation I mean—a 
petite bouchée with the Universes—may take either 
the form of aesthetic contemplation, or that of distant 
castle-building (whether in Spain or within one’s own 
moral training), or that of considering some wonder 
in one of the Universes, or some connection between 
two of the three, with speculation concerning its 
cause. It is this last kind—I will call it “Musement” on 
the whole—that I particularly recommend, because 
it will in time flower into the N.A. One who sits 
down with the purpose of becoming convinced of the 
truth of religion is plainly not inquiring in scientific 
singleness of heart, and must always suspect himself of 
reasoning unfairly. So he can never attain the entirety 
even of a physicist’s belief in electrons, although this is 
avowedly but provisional. But let religious meditation 
be allowed to grow up spontaneously out of Pure Play 
without any breach of continuity, and the Muser will 
retain the perfect candour proper to Musement. (Vol. 
6, p. 458)
This first stage of abduction is to be undergone 
without rules or restrictions. There should be no censorship 
as to what can or cannot be considered. To that end, a 
positive attitude towards the world and the possibility 
of knowledge is needed, as a pessimistic outlook would 
eliminate the “open” mind attitude. There are all sorts of 
relations not amenable to being investigated if it is decided 
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a priori that they are not worth making. Chiasson (1999) 
ended her analysis of the “Neglected Argument” for God 
in the following way:
From this criterion, perhaps we could say that we 
could redefine Peirce’s use of the word God into: any 
hypothesis-formed by means of optimistically undergone 
abductive reasoning—that leads one into consciously 
choosing ethical conduct that results in the living of a good 
life—whether or not the concepts we know as God or 
an after-life enter into the matter at all. (n.p.)
On this basis the search for scientific knowledge for the 
benefit of mankind is seen as a sort of holy quest, like it was 
in the early Renaissance and long after, maybe especially 
until Darwin’s evolutionary theory. Only Peirce managed 
to take that into account and still keep the original vision 
of science intact, but now also combined with aesthetics 
and ethics.
 Knowledge thus has its origin in the divine 
stability and intelligibility of the world according to Peirce. 
As Descartes (1984), Peirce saw the divine as the guaranty 
against total skepticism. But Peirce went much further in 
his evolutionary metaphysics. Peirce (1866-1913/1994) 
wrote in the Monist paper Evolutionary Love:
Everybody can see that the statement of St. John 
is the formula of an evolutionary philosophy, which 
teaches that growth comes only from love, from I will not 
say self-sacrifice, but from the ardent impulse to fulfill 
another’s highest impulse. Suppose, for example, that I 
have an idea that interests me. It is my creation. It is 
my creature; …it is a little person. I love it; and I will 
sink myself in perfecting it. It is not by dealing out 
cold justice to the circle of my ideas that I can make 
them grow, but by cherishing and tending them as I 
would the flowers in my garden. The philosophy we 
draw from John’s gospel is that this is the way mind 
develops; and as for the cosmos, only so far as it yet is 
mind, and so has life, is it capable of further evolution. 
Love, recognizing germs of loveliness in the hateful, 
gradually warms it into life, and makes it lovely. That 
is the sort of evolution which every careful student of 
my essay “The Law of Mind” must see that synechism 
calls for. (Vol. 6, p. 289)
In Peirce’s philosophy, the production of meaning is brought 
into what mechanism sees as “dead” nature by the concepts 
of Firstness and Synechism, combined with hylozoism 
and the development of the universe through the three 
different kinds of evolution: (1) evolution by fortuitous 
variation (tychasm); (2) evolution by mechanical necessity 
(anancasm); and (3) evolution by creative love (agapism). 
But it was with Peirce (1866-1913/1994) as it was with St. 
John that, of those three, love is the greatest and the most 
profound. He wrote:
Evolution by sporting and evolution by mechanical 
necessity are conceptions warring against one another. 
Lamarckian evolution is thus evolution by the force 
of habit…. Thus, habit plays a double part; it serves to 
establish the new features, and also to bring them into 
harmony with the general morphology and function 
of the animals and plants to which they belong. But 
if the reader will now kindly give himself the trouble 
of turning back a page or two, he will see that this 
account of Lamarckian evolution coincides with the 
general description of the action of love, to which, I 
suppose, he yielded his assent. (Vol. 6, p. 301)
Further we must keep in mind that matter is “effete mind.” 
Thus the “Law of Mind” also breaks up habits of matter. 
Peirce wrote:
Remembering that all matter is really mind, 
remembering, too, the continuity of mind, let us ask 
what aspect Lamarckian evolution takes on within 
the domain of consciousness…. the deeper workings 
of the spirit take place in their own slow way, without 
our connivance… Besides this inward process, there 
is the operation of the environment, which goes to 
break up habits destined to be broken up and so to 
render the mind lively. Everybody knows that the long 
continuance of a routine of habit makes us lethargic, 
while a succession of surprises wonderfully brightens the 
ideas…. A portion of mind, abundantly commissured 
to other portions, works almost mechanically. It sinks 
to a condition of a railway junction. But a portion 
of mind almost isolated, a spiritual peninsula, or 
cul-de-sac, is like a railway terminus. Now mental 
commissures are habits. Where they abound, 
originality is not needed and is not found; but where 
they are in defect spontaneity is set free. Thus, the 
first step in the Lamarckian evolution of mind is the 
putting of sundry thoughts into situations in which 
they are free to play. (Vol. 6, p. 301)
This, of course, relates to his epistemology of abduction 
founded in “Pure Play.” It is the “Lamarckian” development 
of mind that makes science as a collective inquiry possible 
at all. Thus in Peirce’s philosophy, the categories work 
according to the “Law of Mind” and there is an inner 
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aspect of Firstness (pure feeling) in matter. But one has to 
be aware of Peirce’s (1866-1913/1994) special conception of 
mind and consciousness. He wrote:
Far less has any notion of mind been established and 
generally acknowledged which can compare for an 
instant in distinctness to the dynamical conception 
of matter. Almost all the psychologists still tell us 
that mind is consciousness. But…unconscious mind 
exists. What is meant by consciousness is really in itself 
nothing but feeling.…there may be, and probably is, 
something of the general nature of feeling almost 
everywhere, yet feeling in any ascertainable degree is 
a mere property of protoplasm, perhaps only of nerve 
matter. Now it so happens that biological organisms 
and especially a nervous system are favorably 
conditioned for exhibiting the phenomena of mind 
also; and therefore it is not surprising that mind and 
feeling should be confounded.…that feeling is nothing 
but the inward aspect of things, while mind on the 
contrary is essentially an external phenomenon. (Vol. 
7, p. 364)
 Thus, the essence of consciousness is feeling and an 
important aspect of Firstness is pure feeling. The possibility 
of being aware on other levels may be reinterpreted as a 
mystical theory in a Peircean framework, as is the possibility 
of being aware of the basic Firstness uniting all manifest 
things. The universe is permeated with Firstness, but that 
is not the same thing as human self-conscious awareness, 
though a consistent theory of evolution has to point to 
it as the origin of human consciousness. Peirce (1866-
1913/1994) wrote:
What the psychologists study is mind, not consciousness 
exclusively. … consciousness is a very simple thing. …
not…Self-consciousness … consciousness is nothing 
but Feeling, in general, -- not feeling in the German 
sense, but more generally, the immediate element of 
experience generalized to its utmost. Mind, on the 
contrary is a very difficult thing to analyze. I am 
not speaking of Soul, the metaphysical substratum 
of Mind (if it has any), but of Mind phenomenally 
understood. To get such a conception of Mind, or 
mental phenomena, as the science of Dynamics 
affords of Matter, or material events, is a business 
which can only be accomplished by resolute scientific 
investigation. (Vol. 7, p. 365)
Peirce was not speaking of human self-consciousness but 
of the essence of consciousness as a phenomenon that 
develops in nature to emerge in new and more structured 
forms in living beings, nervous systems, and language-
based culture. Being a sort of semiotically objective 
idealist, Peirce argued for a scientific study of mind seen 
as a foundational aspect of reality. This is in my view 
(Brier, 2008a) not possible for the mechanistic science 
that starts off with fixed and dead laws that cannot 
develop and cannot encompass emotions and free will 
as causal powers. I am also convinced that cybernetic 
informational computational artificial intelligence 
approaches will also be insufficient (Brier, 2008a), as well 
a biosemiotic ideas of semiosis without interpretation, 
which has it most well argued form in Marcello 
Barbieri’s work (Barbieri, 2008). My main interest in 
Peirce is his work on establishing a new foundation that 
will make it possible for us to work scientifically with 
both matter, mind, and consciousness within the same 
framework.  Peirce (1866-1913/1994) wrote about this 
concept of thought, understood as a function of mind 
and semiosis:
Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. 
It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and 
throughout the purely physical world; and one can 
no more deny that it is really there, than that the 
colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there. 
Not only is thought in the organic world, but it 
develops there. But as there cannot be a General 
without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be 
thought without Signs. We must here give “Sign” a 
very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense 
to come within our definition. (Vol. 4, p. 551)
Here Peirce widened the semiosis concept to include 
pattern-creating processes as nature’s thinking. I would 
prefer to call these proto- or quasi-semiotic processes to 
avoid a too broad sense of the concept leading into a pan-
semiotic metaphysics. Nevertheless, Peirce‘s metaphysics 
operated with the “inside” of material nature. He wrote, 
“Wherever chance-spontaneity is found, there in the 
same proportion feeling exists. In fact, chance is but the 
outward aspect of that which within itself is feeling” (Vol. 
6, p. 265). I find it compatible with an interpretation 
of Peirce’s theory and in accordance with perennial 
philosophy mysticism (Stace, 1960) to see living systems, 
most of all the human, as the way in which the universe 
is becoming aware of itself. Evolution is the development 
of self-organization of systems until they become closed 
and thereby individuals with their own cognition and 
intentions. One needs a body and a nervous system to 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 34 Brier
become (self)-conscious! As Peirce (1866-1913/1994) 
wrote:
Since God, in His essential character of Ens 
necessarium, is a disembodied spirit, and since 
there is strong reason to hold that what we call 
consciousness is either merely the general sensation 
of the brain or some part of it, or at all events some 
visceral or bodily sensation, God probably has no 
consciousness. (Vol. 6, p. 489)
Thus, Peirce’s concept of God is first and most basically 
an abstract transcendental origin and continuity behind 
it all. It is a state of utter nothingness like the Godhead 
of Eckhart and the emptiness of the Buddhists, and it 
manifests as an immanent order and “drive” in evolution 
reminding me most of Hegel’s spirit, but in a somewhat 
different metaphysical framework where evolution and 
scientific thinking is integrated in a model that deviates 
from the Greek Logos thinking and does not have the 
same sort of determinism as Hegel’s theory had. In trying 
to give some hints about what pragmatism is and how 
it can be used on the highest metaphysical principles, 
Peirce summed up his general view of cosmic evolution 
in the following way:
A disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being 
out of time, since all that it is destined to think is 
fully in its being at any and every previous time. 
But in endless time it is destined to think all that 
it is capable of thinking. Order is simply thought 
embodied in arrangement; and thought embodied 
in any other way appears objectively as a character 
that is a generalization of order, and that, in the 
lack of any word for it, we may call for the nonce, 
“Super-order.” It is something like uniformity. Pure 
mind, as creative of thought, must, so far as it is 
manifested in time, appear as having a character 
related to the habit-taking capacity, just as super-
order is related to uniformity. … perfect cosmology 
must …show that the whole history of the three 
universes, as it has been and is to be, would follow 
from a premiss which would not suppose them to 
exist at all. …But that premiss must represent a 
state of things in which the three universes were 
completely nil. Consequently, whether in time or 
not, the three universes must actually be absolutely 
necessary results of a state of utter nothingness. 
We cannot ourselves conceive of such a state of 
nility; but we can easily conceive that there should 
be a mind that could conceive it, since, after all, 
no contradiction can be involved in mere non-
existence. (Vol. 6, p. 490)
Here Peirce dealt with the classical—seemingly as 
we shall see—mystical paradox of the impossibility 
of characterizing the transcendent or absolute in any 
precise way. It is not directly conceivable in concepts 
and it cannot be perceived in the way things can. 
Nevertheless, it seems a logical inference of the analysis 
of Plato. In the Christian mystical tradition, the problem 
is often formulated as the relation between God and the 
Godhead.
Godhead and Superorder
One of the world’s most famous interpreters of the mystical tradition in the East and the West is 
Daitsetz Suzuki, who lived in periods both in the East 
(Japan) and the West (United States). He specialized in 
the mystical foundations for Buddhism and Christianity 
and wrote a book comparing them that was recognized 
as a masterpiece.  Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist 
(Suzuki, 2002) is now a world classic published on the 
Internet. What is most interesting though is that Suzuki 
was a contemporary of Peirce and worked for the editor 
of The Monist, Dr. Paul Carus19. Peirce had an intensive 
exchange with Carus and the Monist was the journal in 
which Peirce published some of his most famous articles 
(see for instance Peirce 1892 a, b, &  c, 1893). Like Carus, 
Peirce had an interest in the mystical side of Buddhism. 
Suzuki (2002) commented about the above-mentioned 
paradox within the mystical view and explained why it 
is only seemingly a paradox in the following way:
God goes and comes, he works, he is active, he be-
comes all the time, but Godhead remains immovable, 
imperturbable, inaccessible. The difference between 
God and Godhead is that between heaven and earth 
and yet Godhead cannot be himself without going 
out of himself, that is, he is he because he is not 
he. The ‘contradiction’ is comprehended only by the 
inner man, and not by the outer man, because the 
latter sees the world through the senses and intellect 
and consequently fails to experience the profound 
depths of Godhead. (p. 9)
In the last quote by Peirce, he also touched upon the 
necessity of a generalization of order as the drive behind 
the evolutionary processes of the three basic categories. 
This “pull” towards order seems to be the final causation 
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of the evolution of the universe. It has an urge to embody 
its thoughts in manifest creation. Or as Plato (2004) 
put it in Timaeus, the One desire to share its love and 
perfection with the imperfect.20 It “flows over” from the 
transcendent into the relative and manifest in time and 
space creating matter as “effete” mind. The last is a Peircean 
formulation. The paradox is that such a transcendent 
order cannot be formulated in any human language. 
David Bohm (1983) discussed the same consequences 
of his own ideas of Wholeness and the Implicate Order, 
the famous book where he worked with the idea of an 
immanent order in nature—inspired by the mystic 
Krishnamurti—that produces the “holomovement.” 
Thus I would say that Bohm’s conception of evolution is 
close to Peirce’s in having a sort of immanent Firstness 
ontology in a process philosophy. In an interview (Weber, 
1972), Bohm talked about the “super implicate order,” 
which seems very similar to Peirce’s “Super-order” that 
has its existence out of time. 
 Like the Buddhists, Peirce saw this order as 
no-thing. The Buddhists talk about emptiness. Peirce 
wrote that the three universes, Firstness (qualia and 
potentialities), Secondness (resistance, will, and brute 
force), and Thirdness (mediation, understanding, and 
habit-taking) must evolve from a transcendental basis in 
an evolutionary metaphysics. Such metaphysics is also 
behind Shankara’s Advaita Vedanta that represents one 
of the purest mysticisms based on the Vedas, and Master 
Eckhart’s Christian mysticism (Næss, 1971). Suzuki 
quoted Eckhart in this matter (Suzuki, 2002, pp. 12-13), 
but here is the original quote from Eckhart (1929/1941):
When I existed in the core, the soul, the river, the 
source of the Godhead, no one asked me where I 
was going or what I was doing. There was no one 
to ask me, but the moment I emerged, the world 
of creatures began to shout, “God”. If someone 
were to ask me: “Brother Eckhart, when did you 
leave home?–That would indicate that I must have 
been at home sometime. I was there just now. Thus 
creatures speak God—But why do they not mention 
the Godhead? Because there is only unity in the 
Godhead and there is nothing to talk about. God 
acts. The Godhead does not. It has nothing to do 
and, there is nothing going on in it. It is never on the 
lookout for something to do. The difference between 
God and the Godhead is the difference between 
action and nonaction.
 When I return to God, I shall be without form, 
and thus my reentry will be far more exalted than 
my setting out. I alone lift creatures out of their 
separate principle into my own, so that in me they 
are one. When I return to the core, the soil, the river, 
the source which is the Godhead, no one will ask me 
whence I came or where I have been. No one will 
have missed me—for even God passes away. (pp. 
225-226)
 Suzuki (2002) commented on this: “It is in perfect accord 
with the Buddhist doctrine of sãnyatã and advances 
the notion of Godhead as ‘pure nothingness’ (ein bloss 
niht)” (pp. 12-13). The formulation out of this paradox is 
essential in much mysticism and in panentheism. There 
is a transcendental reality beyond time and space that 
cannot be spoken of but, still, it is somehow the source of 
everything. Why is it necessary? Peirce (1866-1913/1994) 
explained:
For all Being involves some kind of super-order. For 
example, to suppose a thing to have any particular 
character is to suppose a conditional proposition to 
be true of it, which proposition would express some 
kind of super-order, as any formulation of a general 
fact does. To suppose it to have elasticity of volume 
is to suppose that if it were subjected to pressure its 
volume would diminish until at a certain point the 
full pressure was attained within and without its 
periphery. This is a super-order, a law expressible by a 
differential equation. Any such super-order would be 
a super-habit. Any general state of things whatsoever 
would be a super-order and a super-habit. (Vol. 6, 
p. 490)    
Thus logically the idea of things having universal 
properties demands a logos as universal foundation. 
The big question is then, how does evolution start from 
there? Plato wrote in Timaeus that “the One” overflows 
by love to create something that can contain at least 
some love in an imperfect way, as it is not jealous. In the 
Vedas, it is desire that makes Brahman create the world 
through his Shakti (female force of creation; Sharfstein, 
1978). Brahman is in itself the unmovable foundation, 
like Aristotle’s “unmoved mover.” In Christianity, it is 
the Holy Ghost that acts in creation on behalf of the 
unmovable “Father.” Peirce’s solution is close to these. 
But it is formulated within his own metaphysics and, 
therefore, much closer to a view and a wording acceptable 
from a scientific viewpoint of, for instance, quantum 
field theory and its idea of the world developing from 
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a vacuum field that is never quite at ease. Its nature is 
a spontaneous quantum fluctuation within the limits 
of the Planck Scale (see, for instance, Bohm, 1983). 
Peirce (1866-1913/1994) wrote the following about his 
Cosmology in 1891:
I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten 
years has been to develop my cosmology. This theory 
is that the evolution of the world is hyperbolic, that 
is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite 
past, to a different state of things in the infinite 
future. The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, 
tohu bohu,21 the nothingness of which consists in 
the total absence of regularity. The state of things 
in the infinite future is death, the nothingness of 
which consists in the complete triumph of law and 
absence of all spontaneity. Between these, we have 
on our side a state of things in which there is some 
absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some 
degree of conformity to law, which is constantly 
on the increase owing to the growth of habit. The 
tendency to form habits or tendency to generalize, 
is something which grows by its own action, by the 
habit of taking habits itself growing. Its first germs 
arose from pure chance. There were slight tendencies 
to obey rules that had been followed, and these 
tendencies were rules which were more and more 
obeyed by their own action. There were also slight 
tendencies to do otherwise than previously, and 
these destroyed themselves. To be sure, they would 
sometimes be strengthened by the opposite tendency, 
but the stronger they became the more they would 
tend to destroy themselves. As to the part of time on 
the further side of eternity which leads back from 
the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently 
proceeds by contraries. (Vol. 8, p. 317)
Thus Peirce believes in creation ex nihilo (out of nothing), 
but as an evolution going from Tohu Bohu to some kind 
of perfect order, as soon as the first tendency to take habit 
manifest itself in and with space and time. This is very 
close to David Bohm’s view of the Super Implicate Order 
(Bohm & Weber, 1983) that is his attempt to unite the 
mysticism of Krishnamurti with the modern quantum 
theoretical understanding of reality. Clearly, we move 
over from Firstness into Secondness and Thirdness as 
soon as the tendency to take habits has some differences 
to work on that will not self-destruct. Peirce (1866-
1913/1994) wrote:
Hyperbolic philosophy has to assume for starting-
point something free, as neither requiring 
explanation nor admitting derivation. The free is 
living; the immediately living is feeling. Feeling, 
then, is assumed as starting-point; but feeling 
uncoördinated, having its manifoldness implicit. 
For principle of progress or growth, something 
must be taken not in the starting-point, but which 
from infinitesimal beginning will strengthen itself 
continually. This can only be a principle of growth 
of principles, a tendency to generalization. Assume, 
then, that feeling tends to be associated with and 
assimilated to feeling, action under general formula 
or habit tending to replace the living freedom and 
inward intensity of feeling. This tendency to take 
habits will itself increase by habit. Habit tends to 
coordinate feelings, which are thus brought into the 
order of Time, into the order of Space. (Vol. 6, p. 
585)
For David Bohm this will be when we go form the 
Super Implicate Order to the Implicate Order; or put 
in another way from the transcendent to the immanent. 
Here is another quote from Peirce where he makes this 
clear:
In that state of absolute nility, in or out of time, 
that is, before or after the evolution of time, there 
must then have been a tohu bohu of which nothing 
whatever affirmative or negative was true universally. 
There must have been, therefore, a little of everything 
conceivable. There must have been here and there 
a little undifferentiated tendency to take super-
habits. But such a state must tend to increase itself. 
For a tendency to act in any way, combined with a 
tendency to take habits, must increase the tendency 
to act in that way. (Vol. 6, p. 490).
I think that Peirce’s semiotics fits both Suzuki’s mysticism 
and Eckhart’s, since Suzuki (2002) pointed out that 
God is not creating the world in time, mathematically 
enumerable:
His creativity is not historical, not accidental, not 
at all measurable. It goes on continuously without 
cessation with no beginning, with no end. It is not 
an event of yesterday or today or tomorrow, it comes 
out of timelessness, of nothingness, of Absolute 
Void. God’s work is always done in an absolute 
present, in a timeless ‘now which is time and place 
in itself.’ God’s work is sheer love, utterly free from 
all forms of chronology and teleology. The idea of 
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God creating the world out of nothing, in an absolute 
present, and therefore altogether beyond the control 
of a serial time conception will not sound strange to 
Buddhist ears. (pp. 3-4)
Thus the Big Bang theory does not tell us how the world 
was created. It is an attempt to tell us about the physical 
development of time, space, and energy. Transcendence 
breeds immanence and immanence makes the distinction 
back to transcendence “before” time and “outside” space 
in an ever ongoing process of being and becoming.
 To return to this article’s argument, then, it is 
possible to understand Peirce’s  (1866-1913/1994, Vol. 6, 
p. 452) “Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” 
through the “musing” of “pure play” in the light of his 
benign form of panentheistic mysticism.22 To make 
valuable abductions, the scientist must in a positive way 
open his mind to the basic creative dynamics of both 
mind and matter. Many mystics speak of “emptying” 
the mind, “being simple,” “going beyond the ego,” and 
“letting God in.” But this is not to be understood as divine 
and intentional messages from a personal God or the 
perception of some ready-made and exact transcendental 
ideas. It is rather a listening to the hum of creation or 
the general or basic vibration of the Godhead, flowing 
“into” time, space, life, and mind and back again into its 
own “nothingness” in that fundamental vibration that 
upholds our reality.23 
 As Suzuki (2002) pointed out, “God is neither 
transcendental nor pantheistic” (p. 9, emphasis supplied), 
meaning that God in this conception is not only 
pantheistic or transcendental, but both (panentheism24), 
and thereby the concept covers infinitely more. This 
mystical theory lifts theories of knowledge and nature 
out of determinism. We cannot give a final deterministic 
description of nature, culture, or the knowledge process. 
Thus knowing is much more than knowledge.25 Human 
knowing is a processional flow. It is only by letting go 
into this sporting of pure musement, as Peirce (1866-
1913/1994) called it, by leaving behind any limits imposed 
by previous knowledge and skeptical attitudes that one 
can hope to abduce basic and universal knowledge. I 
think that Suzuki’s (2002) understanding fits well with 
Peirce’s when he wrote:
Eckhart quotes St Augustine: “There is a heavenly 
door for the soul into the divine nature – where some 
things are reduced to nothing.”
 Evidently we have to wait for the heavenly door to 
open by our repeated or ceaseless knocking at it when 
I am “ignorant with knowing, loveless with loving, 
dark with light.” Everything comes out of this basic 
experience and it is only when this is comprehended 
that we really enter into the realm of emptiness 
where the Godhead keeps our discriminatory mind 
altogether “emptied out to nothingness.” (p. 14)
Thus the completely open mind that does not have 
any goal of its own gain is the position where your 
consciousness is open for abducting new ideas through 
musing. But that is of course not the mystical union that 
the mystics seek to stay in. In musing you can at the most 
get a few glimpses and get inspired by those.  Although 
Peirce actually did have a mystical experience, which 
he reported in a letter to a priest but never sent (Brent, 
1998), his major path to the divine insight was clearly 
science, but an abductive-fallibilist pragmaticistic science. 
Where Plato and Descartes believed in transcendental 
ideas that our mind could contemplate in the highest 
and most divine status of mind, Peirce’s abduction with 
a basis in musing gives an evolutionary view on the basic 
source of human ideas. The ideas are vague and can only 
be clarified through the collective dynamic processes of 
science, which is the collective effect of being logical and 
pursuing the empirical testing of hypotheses through 
induction and deduction.
Our understanding is not ready made and fixed 
but fallible, and has to be tested and developed through 
human scientific practice. Thus, although Peirce’s musing 
can be seen as a technique of mystical revelation as 
abductive inspiration, it is not about forgetting real life in 
the ultimate divine existentiality, but a rich inspiration in 
building a common cultural understanding of reality.
 Peirce does not underline the paradoxicality 
of the mystical experience and how it escapes linear 
thinking and presentation in language as, for instance, 
in the Tao Te Ching:
When you look at it you cannot see it;
It is called formless.
When you listen to it you cannot hear it;
It is called soundless.
When you try to seize it you cannot hold it;
It is called subtle.
No one can measure these three to their ultimate 
ends,
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Therefore they are fused to one.
It is up, but it is not brightened;
It is down, but it is not obscured.
It stretches endlessly,
And no name is to be given.
It returns to nothingness.
It is called formless form, shapeless shape.
It is called the intangible.
You face it but you cannot see its front.
You follow it but you cannot see its back.
Holding on to the Ancient Way (Tao)
You control beings of today.
Thus you know the beginning of things,
Which is the essence of the Way (Tao-chi).
(Suzuki, 2002, p. 15)
On the other hand, Peirce said that Firstness is vague. 
It is only being—not existence, as Secondness is 
“existence.” Qualisigns need signs of Secondness to be 
manifest. Peircean philosophy thus can be viewed as 
being on a mystical metaphysical foundation. But like 
Aristotle he develops a philosophy of science on this 
basis, but Peirce’s “logos” of evolutionary love is vague 
and evolutionary. With his theory of abduction, Peirce 
places himself between Plato and Aristotle. It is our 
access to the divine that inspires our understanding 
of the material world through abduction. Induction is 
fallible because the ideas are vague and the laws of nature 
not exact. We have to deduce tests from our abductively 
created theories and then make inductions from them 
to test our fallible theories and keep on correcting them 
in the hope of a steady evolutionary improvement of our 
society’s knowledge basis.
Time, Creation and Evolution 
Seen from the Eternal Now
The mystical theory of cognition and consciousness thus point to an inner link between universe and 
world. If this is possible it should also be possible to 
conceive of an “outer link” between universe and world. 
Now, recapitulating that we cannot speak of time 
and space “outside” and “before” the universe “comes 
into being,” we must realize that, seen from the non-
manifest, one can therefore neither say that the world 
came into existence at a certain time nor that it “always” 
has been, because time first came into existence during 
and with the creation of the universe. The Universe is 
created and recreated in every eternal now in this view. 
When asked what was before the universe was created 
by Good, Master Eckhart (1979) answered that the 
universe was always in the thoughts of God. Seen from 
the Godhead all is one and time is eternity: “To see the 
universe in a grain of sand/ And a Heaven in a Wild 
Flower / Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand / And 
Eternity in an hour” wrote William Blake in “Auguries 
of Innocence.” 
 On the other hand time, seen from a human 
materialistic viewpoint, is real. Time is both attached to 
the phenomenon of perception and to the phenomenon 
of memory. We reconstruct reality historically-
backwards from our memory, and extrapolate the future 
from “now” as a consequence of our expectations based 
on the past. Prigogine and Stengers (1984) underline 
that time is connected to the irreversibility of physical 
complex processes.
 In this way, the conception of time is directly 
attached to our existence as material self-organizing 
cognitive systems (autopoietic systems). It is precisely 
this that is the human viewpoint: a material, autopoietic 
and cognitive system. Reading the Monist paper “The 
Law of Mind” (1892b), it is clear that Peirce’s solution 
to the problem of the world’s existence before existence 
of any observer, is a unique variation of the objective 
idealistic position. Peirce (1866-1913/1994) wrote:
The law of habit exhibits a striking contrast to all 
physical laws in the character of its commands. 
A physical law is absolute. What it requires is an 
exact relation. Thus, a physical force introduces 
into a motion a component motion to be combined 
with the rest by the parallelogram of forces; but 
the component motion must actually take place 
exactly as required by the law of force. On the 
other hand, no exact conformity is required by 
the mental law. Nay, exact conformity would be 
in downright conflict with the law; since it would 
instantly crystallize thought and prevent all further 
formation of habit. The law of mind only makes a 
given feeling more likely to arise. It thus resembles 
the “non-conservative” forces of physics, such as 
viscosity and the like, which are due to statistical 
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uniformities in the chance encounters of trillions of 
molecules.
 The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so 
prominent in Cartesianism, as two radically different 
kinds of substance, will hardly find defenders to-
day. Rejecting this, we are driven to some form of 
hylopathy, otherwise called monism.....
 The only intelligible theory of the universe is 
that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, 
inviscerate habits becoming physical laws. (Vol. 6, p. 
23)
From this position he proceeded to develop the theory 
into the realm of semiotics and knowing. Therefore, in 
the present interpretation where the mathematical laws 
are not considered transcendent, his mystical vision 
seems to offer a combination of the phenomenological 
cognitive approach with the scientific aim to produce 
empirical-mathematical models.
 To be able to accept such a unifying theory as 
that of Peirce, one must consequently admit that energy 
has other aspects than those physics until now has 
described. It is in my opinion precisely this organized 
power that Peirce (1892a & b, 1893) attempted to 
conceptualize in his theory of evolution, where he united 
the mental and the material as an evolutionary variant of 
objective idealism that can encompass modern physics. 
His triadic semiotics and its dynamics are also a major 
improvement over Hegel’s dialectics and later versions of 
modern emergence theories (see Christiansen, 1995).
 Seen from mysticism’s perennial philosophy, there 
is no absolute difference between the two viewpoints of 
science and religion; on the contrary, they supplement 
each other as Peirce saw in his theory of the origin of 
abduction or what Sebeok and Danesi (2000) would later 
call modeling capacity. That capacity is a prerequisite 
for language. Thus the perennial philosophy’s ultimate 
phenomenology can be united with the modern Big 
Bang materialistic evolutionism into a new vision that 
does not contradict the core of the scientific discoveries 
and admits them as parts of a greater comprehensive 
vision that reinstates mankind at the center of both the 
world and the universe.
 Mysticism does not—as so many believe—have 
to be a contradiction of science or philosophy; it is on 
the contrary a theory of their cognitive and existential 
basis. It is precisely mysticism’s reservation with regard to 
the completeness of linguistic knowledge that assures a 
human-centered holism, which is not totalitarian exactly 
because the philosophical-scientific conceptualizing 
process will never be completed. As Nagel (1986) pointed 
out:
If we try to understand experience from an 
objective viewpoint that is distinct from that of the 
subject of the experience, then even if we continue 
to credit its perspectival nature, we will not be 
able to grasp its most specific qualities unless we 
can imagine them subjectively. ... Since this is so 
no objective conception of the mental world can 
include it all. (p. 259)
Notes
1.  Another way of expressing the content of this article 
could be : Peirce’s benignant form of the monstrous 
mysticism of the East:  Panentheism and Scientific 
collectivism combined. See also note 22 for the 
Peirce quote that inspired this version. 
2. I am grateful to Charls Pearson for inviting me 
to the conference on Peirce’s Religious Writings in 
Denver  2003 and to all the participants for their 
inspiration. Special thanks go to Michael Raposa 
(1989) for sending me his masterpiece of a book, 
Peirce’s Philosophy of Religion, which really opened 
my eyes for this aspect of Peirce’s philosophy. I want 
to thank my colleagues and friends Peder Voetmann 
Christiansen, Claus Emmeche, Ole Fogh Kirkeby, 
Allan Combs, and John Deely for their inspiration 
and support for this line of work. Finally I thank 
Gary Fuhrman for his valuable and productive 
critique of an earlier version of the manuscript.
3. Transcendent–a philosophical and theological 
concept–in this context refers to that which is 
beyond our senses and experience; existing apart 
from matter (Raposa, 1989). “It” is beyond and 
outside the ordinary range of human experience or 
understanding. In theology, the concept transcendent 
pertains to God as exalted above the universe. 
 4. In Baldwin’s Dictionary, to which Peirce contri-
buted,  Panentheism is described as: 
A name given by Krause to his attempted 
reconciliation of theism and pantheism; the 
doctrine that God is neither the world, nor yet 
outside the world, but that the world is in him, 
and that he extends beyond its limits.”  (vol. 2, 
p. 255) 
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The term panentheism is Greek for “all-in-God,” 
pan-en-theos. Panentheism posits a god that 
interpenetrates every part of nature, but is also fully 
distinct from nature. God is part of nature, as in 
pantheism, but still retains an independent identity. 
Panentheism is a metaphysics which posits that God 
exists and interpenetrates every part of nature, and 
timelessly extends beyond as well. Panentheism is 
distinguished from pantheism, which holds that 
God is synonymous with the material universe. 
In panentheism, God is viewed as creator and/
or animating force behind the universe, and the 
source of universal truth. A panentheistic view is 
conceiving of God as both immanent in Creation and 
transcendent from it. Plotinus taught that there was 
an ineffable transcendent “god” (The One) of which 
subsequent realities were emanations. From the One 
emanates the Divine Mind (Nous) and the Cosmic 
Soul (Psyche). We will look at Peirce’s philosophy 
in this light also, thanks to Kelly Parker (2002). 
The German philosopher Karl Christian Friedrich 
Krause (1781–1832) seeking to reconcile monotheism 
and pantheism, coined the term panentheism (“all in 
God”) in 1828. This conception of God influenced 
New England transcendentalists such as Ralph 
Waldo Emerson. Panentheism was a major force 
in the Unitarian church for a long time, based on 
Ralph Waldo Emerson’s concept of the Oversoul. It 
is well known that Peirce was influenced by the trans-
cendentalists and the unitarians (see note 22). But 
the word panetheism was not used by him, probably 
because it had not found a common recognized 
definition at that time, as far as we know. The term 
was popularized by Charles Hartshorne (1897–2000) 
an American philosopher who developed Alfred 
North Whitehead’s (1929) process philosophy into 
process theology, which is panentheist. See Clayton 
and Peacock (2004) and Griffin (2004) for a 
modern discussion of the possible relations between 
panentheism and scientific naturalism. 
5. The Eastern Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox 
Churches also have a doctrine called panentheism 
to describe the relationship between the Uncreated 
(God, who is omnipotent, eternal, and constant) 
and His creation. Most specifically, these Churches 
teach that God is not the “watchmaker God” of the 
Western European Enlightenment. Thus another 
foundation for science will have to be build up. 
This is–in my view–what Peirce does in his semiotic 
pragmaticism. Likewise, they teach that God is not 
the “stage magician God” who only shows up when 
performing miracles. God is not merely necessary 
to have created the universe, but that His active 
presence is necessary in some way for every bit of 
creation, from smallest to greatest, to continue 
to exist at all. That is, God’s energies maintain all 
things and all beings, even if those beings have 
explicitly rejected Him. His love of creation is such 
that he will not withdraw His presence. This is close 
to Peirce Agapistic view of evolution as we shall see. 
Thus the entirety of creation is sanctified, and thus 
no part of creation can be considered innately evil.
6. This journal has asked me not to use the standard 
Peirce scholar reference system with CP for collected 
papers and the like as it violates APA format.
7. Immanence is a theological and philosophical 
concept. It is derived from the Latin words, ‘in’ and 
‘manere,’ the original meaning being “to exist or 
remain within.”
8. Firstness has no concrete forms, only potential 
qualities.
 9. The following pages owe a lot to Kelly A. Parker’s 
(2002) brilliant article. He has found a lot of quotes 
and inserted them in a meaningful order, which I 
have borrowed as it fits into the view I have already 
started to develop in Brier (2007, 2008a). But the 
vision of the Neo-Platonist features in Peirce’s theory 
is of course his own theory. I see the similarity, but 
I think his hylozoism is at least as important and 
in combination with Peirce’s openness to the value 
of empirical science brings him closer to Aristotle. 
Still his evolutionary thinking including Darwin’s 
understanding of evolution brought into a semiotic 
framework makes him unique. The view I present 
here seems to fit well with Sheriff (1994).
10. Greek hylē: matter, literally, wood + zōos alive, 
living. The English term was introduced by Ralph 
Cudworth in 1678.  Hylozoism—in this context—is 
the philosophical conjecture that all or some material 
things possess life, or that all life is inseparable from 
matter. It was a doctrine held especially by early 
Greek philosophers. Panpsychism is any system of 
thought that views all matter as alive, either in itself 
or by participation in a world soul, its processes, or 
some similar principle. Here Peirce’s Firstness is an 
interesting candidate. Hylozoism is different from 
the panpsychist idea of possessing a soul, but it 
does attribute some form of sensation to all matter, 
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very much like Whitehead’s panexperientialism. 
Hylozoism it is not a form of animism either, as this 
tends to view life as taking the form of discrete spirits. 
Scientific hylozoism is a protest against a mechanical 
view of the world as dead, but at the same time upholds 
the idea of a unity of organic and inorganic nature 
and derived all actions of both types of matter from 
natural causes and laws. Hylozoism is maintaining 
that living and non-living things are, essentially, the 
same and stipulating that they behave by the same 
set of laws. Peirce presents us with his own semiotics 
version of hylozoism based on his (non-mechanical) 
evolutionary semiotic triadic laws.
11. In philosophy, hyle refers to matter or stuff. The 
Greeks originally had no word for matter in general, as 
opposed to any raw material suitable for some specific 
purpose, so Aristotle adapted the word for “lumber” for 
his ontology. It became the material cause underlying 
change in Aristotelian philosophy. It is that which 
remains the same in spite of the changes in forms. 
In opposition to Democritus’ atomic ontology, hyle 
in Aristotle’s ontology is a plenum or a sort of field. 
Aristotle’s world is an uncreated eternal cosmos, but 
Peirce used the term in an evolutionary philosophy in 
a world that has an end and a beginning.  
12. To get a more full understanding of Peirce’s summom 
bonum, one will also have to go into his Agapistic 
theory of love and the divine, which was inspired 
by the apostle Paul (Peirce, 1893; see also Potters, 
1997).
13. Here I am thinking of the ability to make observations 
and therefore distinctions, so important to the 
foundation of cybernetics and Luhmann’s system 
theory through the work of George Spencer-Brown. 
To make distinctions one needs to have qualia to for 
instance make a distinction between black and white. 
I posit that we need semiosis to produce a distinction 
(Brier, 2008a). Triadic semiosis has Firstness’ 
potentiality and pure feeling as a prerequisite. One 
can hardly talk of time and space in Firstness and one 
needs Secondness and Thirdness to form the concept 
of Firstness at all in a conscious mind. Firstness is 
the beginning and Secondness is the end. Thirdness 
is the mediation between them. It is minds tendency 
to take habits. 
14. I have argued this point in Brier (2007) and 
followed George Spencer-Brown’s very clear theory 
development on this matter, showing that it lead him 
to much the same philosophical position as Peirce.
15. I have chosen Maharishi Mahesh Yogi as a modern 
interpreter of Shankara’s Advaita Vedanta, as 
his teacher was the leader of the order Shankara 
created.
16. But Heidegger was not a part of the mystical 
traditions’ perennial philosophy.
17. A theory that was central to the Matrix movies where 
only the enlightened one could see the Matrix (the 
real reality) and therefore manipulate time and 
space.
18. Peirce defines mystical theory the following way: “… 
mystical theories (by which I mean all those which 
have no possibility of being mechanically explained)” 
(Peirce, 1866-1913/1994, Vol. 6, p. 425).
19. Eugene Taylor (1995) wrote about Suzuki’s story and 
interaction with American pragmatism: 
Deitsetz Suzuki was born in Kanzawa, an area 
north of Tokyo, in 1870 into a family of Renzai 
Zen lineage…. When he finished his schooling 
he became a teacher in a small fishing village 
until his mother died, when he moved to Tokyo 
and began taking classes at Tokyo Imperial 
University. Suzuki entered zen training at this 
time under Setsumon-roshi and began with koan 
training under the Master Kosen. Thereafter, 
under Soyen Shaku, he lived for four years in 
the strict life of a novice monk at Engakuji,…. 
Here Suzuki also came under the influence of 
Kitaro Nishida, a Japanese thinker well versed 
in German idealist philosophy, whom Suzuki 
was later to introduce to the writings of William 
James.  During this time Suzuki undertook the 
first of his many translation projects, rendering 
Dr. Paul Carus’s Gospel of Buddhism into 
Japanese. … Suzuki was invited by Paul Carus 
... to come to the United States, where he was to 
undertake the translation of Chinese and Japanese 
texts for Carus’s business enterprise, The Open 
Court Publishing Company. … Meanwhile, the 
invitation from Carus seems to have precipitated 
a crisis in Suzuki’s zen practice, which had 
become very intense in his four year struggle to 
master the meaning of his koan, Mu, meaning 
“no- thing.” Just before he left, according to his 
teachers, Suzuki experienced self-realization. In 
honor of this occasion his teacher Soyen Shaku 
gave him the name Daisetz, meaning “Great 
Simplicity.”  … Suzuki arrived in San Francisco 
in February 1897…. His first project for Carus 
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was an English rendering of the Tao te Ching, 
the famous Chinese classic attributed to Lao-tzu, 
followed by Ashvaghosha’s Awakening of Faith 
in the Mahayana. …He also began work at this 
time on his first book, perhaps one of the most 
influential for American readers, his Outlines 
of Mahayana Buddhism, which sketched the 
mystical aspects of Buddhism before it came to 
Japan. In all, Suzuki spent almost eleven years 
working for Carus … . Suzuki came into contact 
with the pragmatic American philosophy of 
William James and Charles S. Peirce. James and 
Carus were correspondents, while Peirce had 
published his pioneering series of cosmological 
essays in Carus’ journal  (The Monist) in the 
early 1890s. …. ” (n.p.)  
20. “God made the world good, wishing everything to 
be like himself. To this end he brought order into 
it and endowed it with soul and intelligence. Let 
me tell you then why the creator made this world 
of generation. He was good, and the good can never 
have any jealousy of anything. And being free from 
jealousy, he desired that all things should be as like 
himself as they could be. This is in the truest sense 
the origin of creation and of the world, as we shall 
do well in believing on the testimony of wise men: 
God desired that all things should be good and 
nothing bad, so far as this was attainable. Wherefore 
also finding the whole visible sphere not at rest, but 
moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion, out 
of disorder he brought order, considering that this 
was in every way better than the other. Now the 
deeds of the best could never be or have been other 
than the fairest; and the creator, reflecting on the 
things which are by nature visible, found that no 
unintelligent creature taken as a whole was fairer 
than the intelligent taken as a whole; and that 
intelligence could not be present in anything which 
was devoid of soul. For which reason, when he was 
framing the universe, he put intelligence in soul, and 
soul in body, that he might be the creator of a work 
which was by nature fairest and best. Wherefore, 
using the language of probability, we may say that 
the world became a living creature truly endowed 





21.   The Oxford English Dictionary defines “tohu-
bohu” as “That which is empty and formless; chaos; 
utter confusion (also tohubohu).” Tohu Bohu is 
the formless primordial nothingness of things not 
yet created, the primordial state before Creation. 
It is not really a place, rather a state of being, a 
nonplace. It is the absence of time, form, and space. 
Tohu va-bohu in the Torah is usually translated as 
“empty and shapeless,” from tohu wasteness + bohu 
emptiness, void , but in Hebrew tohu means “ruin,” 
and bohu, “desolation.” These two words are closely 
similar in meaning, tohu signifying that which 
lies waste, without inhabitants or other manifested 
activity, and bohu signifying that which is empty 
or void, so that the combination can be translated 
as the uninhabited void. Used in Genesis (tohu 
wabohu) for the state preceding the appearance of 
the manifested universe—primeval chaos: “And the 
earth was without form, and void; and darkness was 
upon the face of the deep” (Genesis 1:2). 
22. Peirce (1866-1913/1994, Vol. 6, p. 102) himself 
admitted in the following quote to hold a benign 
form of it: 
I have begun by showing that tychism must 
give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in 
which all the regularities of nature and of 
mind are regarded as products of growth, and 
to a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds 
matter to be mere specialized and partially 
deadened mind. I may mention, for the benefit 
of those who are curious in studying mental 
biographies, that I was born and reared in 
the neighborhood of Concord—I mean in 
Cambridge—at the time when Emerson, 
Hedge, and their friends were disseminating 
the ideas that they had caught from Schelling, 
and Schelling from Plotinus, from Boehm, or 
from God knows what minds stricken with 
the monstrous mysticism of the East. But 
the atmosphere of Cambridge held many an 
antiseptic against Concord transcendentalism; 
and I am not conscious of having contracted 
any of that virus. Nevertheless, it is probable 
that some cultured bacilli, some benignant 
form of the disease was implanted in my 
soul, unawares, and that now, after long 
incubation, it comes to the surface, modified 
by mathematical conceptions and by training 
in physical investigations. 
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In his review of Josiah Royce’s book, The World 
and the Individual, Peirce (1866-1913/1994, Vol. 6, 
pp. 106, 108) mentioned mysticism in a somewhat 
skeptical fashion.
23. The last formulation is inspired by Vedic mysticism.
24.  In panentheism, God is viewed as creator and/or 
animating force behind the universe, and the source 
of universal truth. Heraclitus (ca. 535–475 BC) 
viewed the Logos as that which pervades the Cosmos 
and is the force and rationality whereby all thoughts 
and things originate. Gnosticism is Panentheistic, 
believing that the true God is separate from the 
physical universe, but that there are aspects of the 
true God in the physical universe as well. Valentinian 
Gnosticism claims that matter came about through 
emanations of the Supreme Being. To other Gnostics, 
the emanations are akin to the Sephiroth of the 
Kabbalists—description of the manifestation of God 
through a complex system of reality. Panentheism is 
often viewed as a component of Hassidic Judaism 
and Kabbalah. Several Sufi saints and thinkers, 
primarily Ibn Arabi, held beliefs that were somewhat 
panentheistic. These notions later took shape in 
the theory of wahdat ul-wujud (the Unity of All 
Things). Twelver Shi’ism has a panentheistic trend, 
represented by scholars such as Sayyid Haydar Amuli, 
Mulla Sadra, and Ayatollah Khomeini (all of whom 
were influenced by Ibn Arabi). Many interpretations 
of Hinduism can be seen as panentheistic and the 
first and most ancient ideas of panentheism originate 
in the Bhagavad Gita. For example, Lord Krishna’s 
saying to Arjuna: “I continually support the entire 
universe by a very small fraction of My divine 
power,” has been interpreted to support panentheism 
(Bhagavad Gita, Chapter 10, verse 42.). Panentheism 
is the view that the universe is part of the being of 
God; it holds that God pervades the world, but is 
also beyond it. He is immanent and transcendent, 
relative and Absolute. This embracing of opposites is 
often called dipolar. For the panentheist, God is in 
all, and all is in God.
25. Hence the title of the journal, Cybernetics & Human 
Knowing.
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